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Abstract _ 
In a competitive overlapping generation model, underutilization of labor and equip-
ment can be due to the combination of irreversibility of human capital, physical capital 
and technology with idiosyncratic productivity shocks. lrreversibilities and uncertainty 
generate an inefficient allocation of resources among sectors, which takes the form of un-
deremployment and underutilization of capacities at the aggregate level and affects the 
equilibrium path of capital. We provide examples in which this missallocation, called 
structural "mismatch," can be responsible, a.o., for an "inescapable poverty trap," or for 
periodic orbits generating endogenous fluctuations in underemployment. 
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Introduction 
The existence of underemployment of both capital and labor is an important stylized fact 
of actual economies. It is relevant for business cycle analysis as well as for growth, as 
shown by the Europe experience of a continuous growth over the last twenty years with 
a high degree of resources underutilization. In this paper we are interested in studying 
the growth aspect of underemployment, and in particular in pointing out the nature of 
underemployment at steady-state in an otherwise standard equilibrium model. The aim is 
not to discuss whether unemployment is voluntary or not but is focused on whether unem-
ployment is efficient or not. Our model will be shown to add a theory of underemployment 
to the standard Walrasian growth model EL la Diamond (1965). 
Two possibilities could be explored to account for equilibrium underemployment. The 
first one relies on the aggregation of separate markets, each of which is frictionless, with 
the outcome in each separate market being either unemployed workers or unfilled vacan-
cies. This is the approach proposed by Hansen (1970) and Tobin (1972) but which was 
not followed by others in a neo-classical context. I The other possibility is to assume that 
the process of matching workers and jobs in each market is not instantaneous as, e.g., in 
Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and Pissarides (1990). This process is formalized by a 
matching function, which represents a transaction technology which is not infinitely effi-
cient. This technology generates search externalities because searching firms and workers 
cause congestion for each other during trade. Contrary to the Walrasian view of ex-
changes, the information about prices is not sufficient to clear the market at each point 
in time. 
In this paper we go back to Hansen's original idea and we show that it may give 
rise to an interesting interpretation of underemployment relying on the presence of un-
certainty and irreversibilities. Malinvaud (1980) has stressed the importance of demand 
uncertainty in the explanation of underutilized capacities at the firm level. The main 
assumption imposed by Malinvaud is the existence of technological irreversibilities, such 
as "time-to-build" and putty-clay technologies. Indeed, in our model, irreversibilities and 
uncertainty generate an inefficient allocation of resources among sectors. Aggregation 
over heterogenous markets with underemployment and underutilized capacities (unfilled 
vacancies), as in Hansen (1970), generates the coexistence of underutilized capital and 
labor at the macroeconomic equilibrium. This missallocation affects the equilibrium path 
and we provide examples in which it can be responsible for catastrophes like "inescapable 
poverty traps" and/or self-driven oscillatory phenomena. 
The interpretation of underemployment in our framework is as follows: Underemploy-
ment of production factors results from irreversible skill decisions of the households and 
the irreversible investment decisions of the firms being taken without knowing with cer-
lThe "aggregation over micromarkets in desequilibrium" hypothesis proposed by Muellbauer (1978) 
follows the idea of Hansen. It was developped for empirical proposes by Lambert (1988) and Kooiman 
(1984). 
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tainty firms productivity. This implies that some agents have invested their physical and 
human capital in sectors that are hitten by a negative shock, generating underemployment 
of labor because of a lack of productive capacities. On the other hand, some other agents 
have invested in sectors that are hitten by a positive shock, being unable to fully utilize 
their capacities because of a lack of skilled workers in their sector. 
In Section 1 we present the main characteristics of the model and we solve the agents' 
problems. The aggregates and the equilibrium conditions are derived in Section 2. In 
particular, Section 2.1 provides the conditions for the coexistence of unemploYment and 
underutilization of capacities. Examples are presented in Section 2.3. Section 3 concludes. 
The model 
The main assumptions under which this model is built are the following. 
First, it is a two period overlapping generation model, as in Diamond (1965), where 
individuals live two periods and markets are competitive. In each period we have two 
generations: youngs and olds. Let us assume that there is a continuum of youngs in the 
interval [0, Nt ], with Nt growing at the rate n. Each young has one unit of a specific labor 
endowment, works, consumes and lends savings to firms. Old people only consume. There 
is only one good in the economy, which can be consumed or accumulated as capital. To 
produce this good there exist different sectorial technologies, each of them depending on 
specific labor and capital inputs. 2 
Secondly, technological choices are irreversible (a putty-clay technology). As it is stan-
dard in OLG models, the capital stock is decided one period ahead. A given technology 
is always associated to this capital stock implying that the capital-labor ratio is chosen 
when the equipment is bought. 
Third, the factors of production are firm specific, Le., the labor markets are segmented 
and investment is irreversible and cannot be valuable elsewhere. There is a continuum 
of sectors in the interval [0,1], with a large number of firms and workers in each sector. 
Each sector is denoted by i and corresponds to a particular segment of the labor market. 
3The number of workers in each sector is supposed to be equal to Nt . We normalize the 
2This economy can be seen as a particular case of a more general economy where there is a continuum 
of goods, each of them being produced with specific capital and labor inputs. In this particular version 
all goods are perfect substitutes. Alternatively, we can see this economy as one in which firms are 
geographically located and sectors represent a particular location; goods are allowed to move costlessly 
among places, while inputs are not. 
3We can see this economy as if individuals live three periods. In each period we have three generations: 
children, youngs and olds. Each child does not consume at all (its consumption is implicitly in the utility 
function of its parents) and chooses costlessly a specific human capital. At the time of the kids' decision, 
expected labor incomes are the same for all types of human capital, implying that kids are distributed 
uniformely over the different sectors of the labor market at equilibrium. 
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number of firms to N t ,4 allowing us to work with per- capita variables. 
Finally, at the time of the decisions on capital and the related technology, there is 
some idiosyncratic uncertainty concerning the average productivity of capital. Moreover, 
after their realization, shocks become public information. Consumption, savings, wages, 
employment and production take place simultaneously under full-infonnation. Since all 
uncertainty is firm specific (there is no aggregate uncertainty), the bond market portfolio 
pays the riskJess rate of return. This timing, even if it is relatively standard, is relevant 
in generating underemployment of production factors. 
1.1 The consumer problem 
All individuals have identical preferences over consumption when young Cilt, consumption 
when old Ci2t+l and employment lit- These preferences are assumed to be additively sep-
arable in consumption and employment. The utility of consumption is represented by a 
function U(Cilt, Ci2t+d, which is supposed to be homogeneous of degree one and increasing 
in its arguments. differentiable and concave in the positive orthant. The disutility of labor 
is given by the function v(lit), which is increasing, differentiable and convex. The repre-
sentative individual of generation t with specific labor endowment i solves the following 
problem: 
max U(Cilt, Ci2Hd - V(lit) 
Cilt,Ci2t+l,lit 
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint 
The real wage Wit paid in sector i and the real interest rate rt+l are taken as given by the 
household. 
The corresponding labor supply function, lit == ts(Wit, rHI), must verify 
(1) 
where 1 ~(r) = UI (1 - O(r),O(r) (1 + r)) 
represents the inverse of UI , the marginal utility of consumption when young. Equation (1) 
is standard and states that the real wage must be equal to the marginal disutility of labor. 
The corresponding saving function is: 
(2) 
4Because the production function has constant returns to scale, the number of firms is undetermined 
and irrelevant. 
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where Sit represents savings. Given that the utility function is supposed to be linear-
homogeneous, individual savings are a proportion of individual labor income, i.e., the 
function () represents the "propensity to save" and depends only on the interest rate. 
Since labor is firm specific, individuals from the same generation could have a different 
labor endowment and therefore a different labor income. However, they have the same 
propensity to save, implying that aggregate savings are a proportion () of aggregate labor 
income. 
1.2 The putty-clay technology 
As it is standard in OLG models, the capital employed in production at time t is bought at 
time t - 1. The technology is putty-clay and the choice of time t productivities is also done 
at time t - 1 (the bought capital incorporates a given factors' productivity). Moreover, 
each sector has its own technology and employs specific inputs. Let Yi denote the ith 
sector production and ki and li the ith specific capital and labor inputs respectively. The 
technology is then different from one segment of the labor market to another, even if for 
reason of symmetry the production function is assumed to take the same functional form 
for all sectors. Assuming constant-return-to-scale, average productivi ties depend on the 
capital-Iabor ratio. The average productivities of labor and capital are given by f(Xit) 
and f~:tl /-Lit respectively, where Xit is the ex-ante capital-Iabor ratio and /-Lit is a stochastic 
shock, which is defined below. Due to the putty-clay assumption, the capital stock kit 
and the capital-Iabor ratio Xit are decided at time t - 1, and production Yit and the labor 
input lit are chosen at time t. 
The average productivity of capital is supposed to be affected by some multiplicative 
stochastic shock, denoted by /-Lit E R+. 5 We assume that /-Lit is drawn from the distribution 
F(P.it), the same for all i and t, such that E(/-Lit) = 1. There is "heterogeneity" in 
this economy and it is related to the realizations of the idiosyncratic shocks /-Lit. The 
distribution over sectors of the realized /-Lit shocks follows the same distribution F(/-Lit). 
The ex-post production function is Leontief with given productivities for capital and 
labor. Since capital was chosen in the previous period and the stochastic shock /-Lit has 
unit mean, we can define 
.1' = f(Xit) k.!lit -
Xit 
~t, 
where 11ft represents expected productive capacities. 
SWe assume for simplicity that the productivity of labor is non stochastic. 
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1.3 The sectorial labor market equilibrium 
In each segment of the labor market wages and employment are determined competitively. 
Since kit and Xit were decided in period t - 1, labor demand is infinitely elastic until full-
capacity is reached and then it becomes infinitely inelastic, as it is shown in Figure 1. 
Firms are optimally engaged in production if the real wage is at most equal to the average 
productivity of labor, in which case the ex-post optimal choice of production and labor 
implies 
Yit = f(xit)lit ~ 11ft /-tit, 
when Wit ~ f(Xit). Let us define lft = ~/-tit as the employment level needed to produce at 
full-capacity. Let us call lit = lS(f(Xit), Tt+l) the number of hours optimally supplied by 
each worker when the equilibrium wage is equal to the average productivity of labor. Since 
firms would not hire workers if the real wage was greater than the average productivity, lit 
defines an upper bound on employment, which we call the "efficient-employment" level. 
Without uncertainty the firm optimally chooses kit, such that lft = lft and the economy is 
at the efficient-employment equilibrium. Because capacities decided at t-l are hitten by a 
stochastic shock, they are not always sufficiently high to allow for "efficient-employment". 
In this case, the equilibrium wage is smaller than the average productivity of labor and 
workers decide optimally to work less than "efficient-employment". More precisely they 
will work if lftJ-lit < lft· 
Let us call jlit the value of /-tit such that capacities are just enough to employ the 
maximum number of hours: 
kit - f
-/-tit = lit·Xit 
Since all firms in sector i are identical, they set the same kit and Xit. The definition of 
P allows us to express the outcome of the competitive equilibrium as a function of the 
idiosyncratic shock: 
_ {~(Tt+l) v' (~J-lit) if /-tit ~ Pit 
(3) 
f(xit) otherwise 
~/-tit if 
{ lS(f(Xit) ,Tt+l) otherwise. 
(4) 
In equation (4) we assume that the rationing scheme is uniform, Le., totallabor supply is 
allocated uniformely among firms. Notice that, even if rationed firms were interested in 
increasing labor supply by paying a wage greater than the equilibrium wage, this policy 
would not be optimal since, with a marginal productivity, such a wage would yield negative 
profits. 
Figure la represents the first of these two cases and Figure 1b the second. The realized 
productivity shock /-tit could be: (a) "bad" (i.e. /-tit ~ jlit), in which case capacities are so 
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Figure 1: The labor market equilibrium 
Figure la Figure lb 
w w 
f(x) f-------t- f (x) I------- ~ 
[f 
small that the firm produces at full-capacity, and the equilibrium wage is smaller that the 
average productivity of labor; or (b) "good" (Le. J-tit ~ Pit), in which case the equilibrium 
wage is given by the average productivity of labor and capacities are underemployed. We 
label "underemployment equilibrium" the first case (Figure la) and "underutilization (of 
capital) equilibrium" the second case (Figure 1b). 
1.4 Firm's capital and technological choices 
As stated before, the capital stock and the capital-labor ratio for period t are chosen at 
t - 1. Since there is uncertainty about the productivity of capital, the firm h of sector i 
chooses x~ and k~ in order to maximize expected profits, Le., 
where 
[h . [k~ if]it = mm h J-tit, it . 
X it 
The parameter 0 ::; 6 ::; 1 represents the depreciation rate. Wages are taken as given by 
the firm and, from (3), are a function of the shock. Expected profits can be written as: 
6 
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where 
h If
-h X it it 
/-Lit = -kh 
it 
The first order necessary conditions for x~ and k~ are respectively: 
(5) 
(6) 
To interprete these conditions let us call d~ at the ratio of expected production to 
expected capacities: 
dh = x~ Et - 1(l~) 
It kh it 
Combining conditions (5) and (6) with the definition of d, one has 
{) + Tt = f'(x~) d~. (7) 
It states that the user cost of capital must be equal to the expected marginal benefit 
of increasing capital at the optimum. The marginal benefit is equal to the marginal 
productivity of capital times the ratio of expected production to expected capacities, Le., 
marginal productivity is weighted by the probability that the new equipment be effectively 
utilized. 
Since the economy is perfectly competitive and returns to scale are constant, from the 
optimality conditions we can easily show that expected profits are zero. 
The aggregate equilibrium 
Since all segments are ex-ante identical and the expected value of the shock is one, het-
erogeneity in the economy can be seen as deviations from the capital average productiv-
ity. But this heterogeneity exists only ex-post, after the realization of the idiosynchratic 
shocks. Since there is 'no heterogeneity ex-ante, all firms choose the same capital stock 
and capital-labor ratio. By symmetry, the optimality conditions for x and k are the same 
for all firms in all sectors and they are given by (5) and (7), Le., 
(8) 
(9) 
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where 
_ ZS(f(Xt), Tt+l) Xt 
J.Lt = k . (10)
t 
Wages have been replaced by their value from (3) and Xt, kt and Lt represent optimal 
capital-Iabor ratio, capital stock and expected employment respectively. Per-capita ag-
gregate employment, which is equal to expected employment, results from the aggregation 
over J.L of individual employment and it can be written as 
(11) 
From (3) and (4) aggregate labor income is given by 
Combined with the optimal condition for x (equation (8)), the aggregate labor income 
becomes: 
(12) 
where Lt is given by (11). Note that the wage index is equal to the ex-ante marginal 
productivity of labor. 
From the optimality conditions for capital and the capital-Iabor ratio, we know that 
aggregate pure profits are zero, even if some firms have negative profits and other firms 
have positive profits. A costless insurance contract taken by the olds is supposed to share 
the aggregate zero pure profits and to avoid that some firms be unable to repay their 
debts. 
Finally, the equilibrium requires the clearing condition between savings and the capital 
stock. which from (2) and (12) is 
(13) 
The equilibrium path is described by (8), (9), (10), (11) and (13) with given initial 
values Xo and ko, which verify equation (8). The dynamic behavior of the economy is 
characterized by the non-linear first-order difference equation (13), after substitution of 
all other equations. As it is standard in OLG models, different types of equilibria are 
possible. Some characteristics of the general model are presented in sections 2.1 and 2.2, 
and a deeper analysis of the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty and heterogeneity is 
provided in section 2.3 by the mean of examples in which equilibria and their qualitative 
properties depend on the variance of the idiosyncratic shock. 
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2.1 Underemployment and capacity utilization 
Proposition 1. Provided that the probability of being in the "bad state" is strictly 
positive, there is underemployment at equilibrium. 
Proof: if F(P) > 0, then 
since It ~ dF(J-l) < It dF(J-l).o 
At equilibrium, if a positive measure of firms are in an "underemployment equilib-
rium" , there is underemployment of labor in the aggregate. 
Proposition 2. Provided that the probability of being in the "good state" is strictly 
positive, there is underutilization of capital at equilibrium. 
Proof: if 1 - F(p) > 0 then 
P oo 
dt = :r = 1J-l dF (J-l) +h PdF (J-l ) 
since I;c PdF(J-l) < I;c J-l dF(J-l). 0 
At equilibrium, if a positive measure of firms are in an "underutilization equilibrium" , 
there is underutilization of capacities in the aggregate. 
The coexistence of underemployment of labor and underutilization needs only that 
the probability of being in both the "bad" and the "good" states be strictly positive. For 
any non-degenerate continuous distribution function F defined in ]0,00[, this property is 
verified if 0 < fJ. < 00. 
Underemployment of production factors results from the fact that the irreversible skill 
decisions of the households and the irreversible investment decisions of the firms are taken 
without knowing with, certainty finns productivity. This implies that some agents have 
invested their physical and human capital in sectors that are hitten by a negative shock, 
generating underemployment of labor because there is a lack of productive capacities. On 
the other hand, some other agents have invested in sectors that are hitten by a positive 
shock, being unable to fully utilize their capacities because ther e is a lack of skilled 
workers in their sector. In this economy, uncertainty and irreversibilities preclude an 
efficient allocation of capital and labor across sectors. This type of inefficiency is known 
as "structural mismatch" (see Sneessens (1987)). 
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2.2 The capital-Iabor ratio 
We have in this framework three different definitions for the capital-Iabor ratio: Xt repre-
sents the optimal capital-Iabor ratio, which is incorporated in the machines; kt represents 
the capital stock per-capita; kt/lt represents the effective capital-Iabor ratio. From the 
definition of dt we know that 
The effective capital-Iabor ratio is larger than the optimal one because some units of 
capital are not employed at equilibrium. Moreover, from the definitions of dt and It, we 
know that 
-1 
t p 001[kZ; ] = [Xtt l/-LdF(/-L) + [ktt 1i l: dF(/-L). 
This means that the effective capital-Iabor ratio (the one which is observed at the macroe-
conomic level) is a weighted average of (i) the ex-ante capital-Iabor ratio which is the ef-
fective ratio prevailing in the firms with a bad productivity shock and (ii) the capital stock 
per capital which is the capital-Iabor ratio prevailing in firms with a good productivity 
shock. 
2.3 Examples 
To illustrate the effect of uncertainty on the equilibrium path, we impose the following 
particular assumptions. The utility function U(C1' C2) is Cobb-Douglas, which implies that 
the propensity to save is constant 8(r) = 8. The disutility of labor is zero, i.e., v(lt) = 0; 
implying that If = 1, Vt. The production function is CES, 
1 f(Xt) = A(ax;"r + 1 - ar-:r 
where A > 0, 'Y 2: -1 and °< a < 1. The idiosyncratic shock is lognormal distributed, 
l.e.) 
/-Lit=exp{-~ +f} 
where f"" N(O, 0'2). Following Lambert (1988) equation (11) can be approximated by 
Xt)P )-~ 2 4J(-2/0')
It ~ (( k + 1 where p = -1 + ~ 4>(-2/0')'t 
4J represents the standard normal density and 4> the standard cumulative normal distri-
bution. Notice that p > °and it is an inverse function of 0'. 1/p measures the structural 
mismatch. Additionally, with the same approximation it can be shown that 
J.i- ( Xt l t )P+1
l/-LdF(/-L) ~ k; 
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Figure 2: The saddle-node bifurcation 
Q(kt ; 00) 
Q(kti Po) 
Under these assumptions, from (8) and (11), there is a positive and simple relation between 
kt and Xt, 
_ ( a ) Ap k::rtPXt - -- t· (14)I-a 
From equations (8), (11) and (13) the equilibrium condition can be written as a first order 
difference equation for capital kt 
(15) 
with glven initial value ko. Under similar assumptions on preferences and technology, the 
transition function Q(kt ; 00) corresponds to the standard Diamond economy, that we call, 
in the sequel, the benchmark case. 
Notice first that, in the Cobb-Douglas case b = 0), (14) is linear and (15) ensures that 
there exists a unique and stable positive steady state value for k, which is monotonically 
increasing in p. The rise in microeconomic uncertainty increases the misallocation of 
production factors across sectors and the underemployment rates, and decreases the steady 
state capital stock. 
Let us now consider two cases in which the presence of irreversibilty and uncertainty, 
reflected here in the mismatch parameter p, changes the qualitative nature of the equilib-
rium. 
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2.3.1 An inescapable poverty trap 
When 'Y > 0, a positive steady state is almost never unique in the benchmark case. 6 The 
saving locus is shown in Figure 2. When there exist two positive steady state equilibria 
k and k, the equilibria k and zero are asymptotically stable and k can be interpreted as 
a "poverty trap": If the initial value ko is lower than k the economy converges to the 
zero steady state; If ko is larger than k the economy converges to the high equilibrium k. 
When uncertainty increases, implying a decrease in P, Q(k;p) moves down in the {kt, kt+d 
space and both positive equilibria move nearer. There is a "saddle-node bifurcation" at 
P = Po, where both positive equilibria become equal.7 When P < Po there is no positive 
steady-state equilibrium. 
In this example, the rise in structural mismatch generates a reduction in revenues and 
savings~ moving down the transition function. The highest steady state value of capital 
decreases and the poverty trap increases until the bifurcation point is reached, after what 
the poverty trap becomes inescapable. 
2.3.2 A two-period endogenous cycle 
\\Then 'Y = -1, the production factors are perfectly substitute and Q(k; 00) is horizontal. 
\Vhen uncertainty appears, Q(k; p) becomes negatively sloped and the steady state capital 
stock decreases. The (local) dynamics of capital is characterised by damped oscillations. 
There is a "flip-bifurcation" at P = PI, where the slope of Q(k; PI) is equal to -1. When 
P becomes smaller than PI the positive steady-state is still unique but becomes unstable. 
As the steady-state equilibrium looses stability, a stable two-cycle appears. With this 
self-driven oscillatory phenomenon (see Boldrin and Woodford (1990) for a survey of 
such fluctuations in equilibrium models), the economy moves from (a) a period in which 
olds are poor, the technology is labor intensive, unemployment of youngs is low and 
savings are high, to (b) a period where olds are rich, the technology is capital intensive, 
unemployment of youngs is high and savings are low. Generations move from rich to poor 
in the two-period cycle. The amplitude of this cycle increases when P diminishes. 8 
In this example, the rise in structural mismatch moves down the transition function, 
as before, but affects also its slope around the steady-state, making the economy less and 
less quick to converge.· At the flip-bifurcation point, the steady-state is no longer stable 
and a two-period endogenous cycle appears. This shows that, even in cases where the 
benchmark model is very poor, the introduction of irreversibility and uncertainty may 
give rise to interesting dynamics. As the models of Pissarides (1990) and Diamond and 
Fudenberg (1989), our framework is able to generate unemployment cycles. 
6It is a standard example in the OLG literature. See Azariadis (1993). 
7The bifurcation point must verify Q(k; po) = k and Q'(k; po) = 1. 
80ther changes in the qualitative behavior of the dynamic system appear for very small values of p. 
(p:$ 1) 
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Figure 3: The flip bifurcation 
Q(k;oo) 
---- Q(k; P > pd 
--- Q(k;p < PI) 
Conclusions 
In an OLG economy, we show that technological irreversibilities and segmented labor mar-
kets, combined with idiosyncratic uncertainty, generate unemployment and underutiliza-
tion of capacities. Because it takes one generation to reallocate resources among sectors, 
idiosyncratic shocks produce missallocation and inefficiency, which takes the form of un-
deremployment of production factors. This framework provides an alternative approach 
to the search model of Pissarides (1990) to analyse structural unemployment problems. 
As Cooper and John (1988) pointed out, inefficiency in the search model can be inter-
preted as a coordination problem due to trading externalities in uncertain conditions. 
Inefficiency in our framework could also be interpreted under the light of the coordination 
failure literature. Irreversibilities engender strategic complementarities between the skill 
decision of the households and firms' decision in the presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty. 
Note also that, contrary to Pissarides' framework in which wages are fixed by a bargaining 
between firms and workers, our labor market is Walrasian, and wages differ across sectors. 
The interest of our approach is to link heterogeneity with the presence of uncertainty 
13 
and irreversibility, and to make possible the analysis of the effect of idiosynchratic uncer-
tainty on growth. To illustrate this, we provide two examples in which the variance of 
the idiosyncratic shock, which also measures heterogeneity and mismatch in the economy, 
plays a crucial role. In the first example, the mismatch parameter presents a "saddle-
node bifurcation" and an increase in uncertainty may put the economy in an "inescapable 
poverty trap." In the second example, the mismatch parameter presents a "flip bifurca-
tion" and an increase in uncertainty may generate endogenous cycles. 
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